Several types of failures can occur in the GPS satellites that transmit the ranging signals to the users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several types of failures can occur in the GPS space segment designed to deliver the ranging signals to the users. Among the potential failures, a specific type of failure in the signal generation process aboard the satellite may result in an anomalous waveform being transmitted, called an 'evil waveform'. Such a failure was already observed in 1993 on a flying satellite, and an analysis of the causes of failures have led to the derivation of a mathematical model of these waveforms [ 11.
Evil waveforms are GPS signals that have a distorted PRN code modulation waveform. The deformation is modeled by a lead or a lag of the rising or falling edges of the modulation code, andor by a second-order filtering of this waveform.
The main impact is a rupture of the sy"etIy of the cross-correlation peak inside the tracking channel, therefore inducing a different measurement error for two receivers that would not have the same loops architecture.
As a consequence, there is a potential for evil waveforms to induce large tracking errors of differential systems. Some international standardization forums, in RTCA or ICAO, encourage the development of adequate ground monitoring techniques and are on the way to impose constraints on the airborne receiver to make sure the differential tracking error does not exceed the required accuracy level.
Several propositions of ground monitoring techniques are currently discussed, and this paper is focused on the proposition made in [ 11.
EVIL WAVEFORM MODEL
The evil waveform is a GPS signal that has a distorted PRN code modulation waveform. The failure giving birth to an evil waveform occurs in the code modulation generation channel only, therefore the transmitted carrier is not affected. Two types of failure can occur that result in an evil waveform being radiated, A failure in the digital code chip generation module can alter the synchronization of some of the C/A code chip edges. A mismatch of the analog bandlimiting filter can distort the physical waveform being transmitted.
As As shown in figure 3, model B evil waveforms raise all the frequency components of the code spectrum located around Fd,. As a result, the cross-correlation function is also filtered by the 2nd order filter. Model C evil waveforms are a combination of the lead/lag effect with the 2nd order filtering effect. Figure  4 shows the impact of this combination on the power spectrum density and on the cross-correlation function.
IMPACT OF EVIL WAVEFORMS ON GPS RECEIVER
The tracking errors due to evil waveforms depend on the exact characteristics of a receiver. First, the incoming signal is amplified, down-converted, filtered and converted to digital samples by the RF front-end. Then, this signal is sent to the tracking loops that try to generate local replicas of the incoming carrier and code modulation.
The amount of distortion conveyed by the evil waveform entering the tracking loops is determined by the RF frontad filter, that rejects out-of-band frequency components. The Delay Lock Loop (DLL) is designed to track nominal CIA codes having neartriangular cross correlation function, and is therefore misleaded by the deformations on the correlation values.
Therefore, the main parameters are: the transfer function of the RF frontad precorrelation filter (bandwidth and group delay variations) the DLL discriminator function (value of the spacing between correlator outputs, form of the combination of these outputs) As these parameters may vary considerably from one receiver to the other, the differential tracking error may be severely affected by the evil waveform.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SIGNAL QUALITY MONITORING TECHNIQUES
The techniques used to detect the presence of an evil waveform all tend to check whether the crosscorrelation function sigmficantly departs from the nominal triangular shape. aeH is the standard deviation of the test metrics K f a is the expansion factor required to guarantee a specific false alarm probability
The MDEs are computed so that both the false alarm rate and the probability of missed detection are met:
It is proposed in [2] that the probability of missed detection be set to lo", inducing Kd=3.09, assuming the test metrics has a gaussian distribution. Similarly, a proposed allocation analysis in [2] concludes to a false alarm rate of l.25-1Oa when using a total of 8 parallel test metrics on measurements coming from 6 satellites correlated over 100s. Therefore, Kf,=5. 70, and
If no fault is detected by the SQM algorithm, then the pseudorange correction elaborated using the 0.1 Tc DLL measurement is sent to the airbome users. Figure 5 : Architecture of complete GPS simulator. For the analysis reported here, the propagation module was used in a simple mode, where it only outputs a GPS signal affected by the evil effects.
As illustrated in figure 5 , the complete GPS simulator is composed of three modules For the analysis reported here, only the last two modules were used. Therefore, this simulator was only used as a reference during the development of the simplified GPS receiver simulator, and for the evaluation of the effect of quantization on the evil waveforms.
V. 2 Simplijed GPS receiver simulator
A simplified GPS receiver simulator was developed for this study, where the base signals are the crosscorrelation functions between the pure C/A code and each of the evil waveform, depending on the evil parameter values. These functions are then filtered by the RF front-end filter, and they are finally used to determine the stable zerocrossing point of the &scrimination function of the DLL, as presented in figure 6. 
+-order Filtering
Architecture of simplij7ed GPS receiver Therefore, like the complete GPS simulation tool, th~s tool can also simulate the operations of the ground monitoring unit and determine the differential code tracking error of the airbome receiver. As indicated previously, this simulator is very fast, therefore we used only this receiver to determine the results that are presented in this report, except the results conceming the quantization effect.
The simulator can be run in Merent modes, using different parameters values, enabling the user to:
Generate a discrete evil waveform with any characteristics (d=lead/lag, ordamping, Fpsystem frequency). 
W.3 Analysis of results
The simulation results for model A show that the final tracking errors are acceptable in the three zones proposed for Early-Late DLLs.
For model B, the final differential anborne tracking error is too large, particularly in region 1. But these results are changed by modifying either the threat model exploration (density and starting point) or the sampling frequency. These differences are explained by the changing behaviour of the SQM depending on the simulation assumptions. The acceptability of the three zones is therefore conditional to the assumptions.
For model C, the three zones are hardly acceptable due to marginal errors for narrow correlator spacings and wide bandwidths. We can see that for low values of 0 and for Fd within the ground filter bandwidth, some large oscillations appear. This means that for small variations in Fd, the criteria may vary significantly. Therefore, depending on the threat model exploration (origin and density), the results can change dramatically. Figure 16 presents the results obtained when using a very fine granularity to explore the threat spce for
VII. EXISTENCE OF SINGULAR POINTS

~0 . 8
MHz. This shows that the test criteria present oscillations that come extremely close to the MDEs, inducing a very large susceptibility of the results to the simulation assumptions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
The SQM analyzed here does not protect all the airborne users inside the proposed allowed regions, and other techniques have to be investigated. This SQM is also c-cterized by an oscillation of its test criteria that induce a very high susceptibility of the results to the simulation assumptions.
As this SQM is not satisfymg, work is now underway to propose new SQM techniques that would better protect the airborne users.
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